SYLLABUS.

for double and treble damages for cutting and removing
timber.1
Such is, in general, the law in Pennsylvania on the subject
of EMINENT DOMAIN as is derived from an examination of the
cases. The numerous Acts of Assembly (principally relating
to railroad, municipal and other corporations, and to roads
and highways), in a manner connected with the subject, merely
regulate the exercise of the right and establish a method of
procedure in certain instances. These legislative enactments
are outside the scope of this paper and have only been
referred to, incidentally, in connection with some of the cases
considered.
ALFRED ROLAND HAIG.
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SYLLABUS.
(.'
In order that a person who has been injured by an accident may hold
another responsible therefor upon the ground of negligence, there must be a
causal connection between the negligence and the hurt, and such causal connection must be uninterrupted by the interposition between the negligence and
the hurt of any independent human agency.
(2.) A contractor for the erection of a hotel building who uses improper
material in its construction and in other respects departs from the specifications embodied in his contract, so that the building when completed is structurally weak and unsafe, will not be liable to a guest of the hotel for an injury
caused to him by such defective construction, but occuring after the owner has
taken possession.

(3.) The contractor would be responsible to his employer for any loss sustained by the latter in consequence of his failure to erect the building in conformity with the requirements of the contract; but, to one who was not a party
tothe contract, and between* whom and himself no confidence has been
exchanged, he owes no duty which will support an action.
1 Belhlehem South Gas &

WVater Co. v. Yader, ir2 Pa. 136.
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The facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court.
Opinion, MR. CHIEF

JUSTICE PAXSON:

The defendant, Philip H. Somerset, entered into a contract with the Sea Isle City Hotel Company, for the erection
of a hotel building, at Sea Isle City, according to certain plans
and specifications. The building was completed and accepted
by the hotel company in the presence of their architect and
the chairman of the building committee. Subsequently, at
an entertainment given at the hotel by the proprietor or lessee,
a crowd of persons, some twenty or more, having collected
on the porch, a girder, which in part supported it, gave way,
the porch fell, and by reason thereof the plaintiff was injured.
He brought this suit in the court below against the contractor,
to recover damages for the injury he thus sustained, with the
result of a verdict in his favor for $4,000.

Upon the trial the defendant asked the court below to
instruct the jury that if "Somerset, the defendant, was the
contractor for the erection of the hotel in question for the Sea
Isle City Hotel Company, the owner, and after completion
delivered possession of it to the said Sea Isle City Hotel
Company on June 30, I88o, which company accepted it; and if
the accident in question happened after June 30, I888, and
while said owner or his lessee was in possession, then the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover against the defendant." See
first assignment. This point was refused, and it fairly presents
the important question in the case.
The contention of the plaintiff is that the accident was
caused by the defective construction of the porch; that it
was not according to the plans and specifications called for by
the contract; that timbers inferior in size and quality to those
called for by the plans were used; that these defects were not
observable after the building was completed, and in point of
fact were unknown to the company when it accepted the building from the contractor.
We must assume these allegations as substantially found
by the jury, and the question arises, what is the responsibility
of the contractor under such circumstances ? That he would
be responsible to the company for any loss sustained by it in
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consequence of his failure to erect the building in conformity
to the plans and specifications, may be conceded. There was
a contractual relation between them, and for breach of a contract, not known to and approved by the company, he would
be liable. Is he also liable for an injury to a third person not
a party to the contract, sustained by reason of defective construction ? It is very clear that he was not responsible by
force of any contractual relation, for as before observed, there
was no contract between the parties, and hence there could
have been no breach. If liable at all, it can only be for a
violation of some duty. It may be stated as a general proposition that a man is not responsible for a breach of duty where
he owes no duty. What duty did the defendant owe to the
plaintiff? The latter was not upon the porch by invitation of the
defendant. The proprietor of the hotel, or whoever invited or
procured the presence of the piaintiff there, may be said to
have owed him a duty-the duty of ascertaining that the porch
was of sufficient strength to safely hold the guests whom he
had invited. The plaintiff contended, however, that as the
hotel .company was not responsible, the contractor must necessarily be so. This, however, is moving in a circle. It by no
means follows that because A. is not responsible for an accident, B., or some other person must be.
Authorities are not abundant upon this point, for the reason
that it is comparatively new. I do not know of any direct
ruling upon it in this State. The true rule, which we think
applicable to it may be found in Wharion on Negligence. It
is as follows:

2d ed., Sec. 438:

"There must be causal connection between the negligence and the hurt; and such causal connection is interrupted
by the interposition between the negligence -and the hurt of
any independent human agency * * * Thus, a contractor
is employed by a city to build a bridge in a workmanlike
manner, and, after he has finished his work and it has been
accepted by the city, a traveler is hurt when passing over it
by a defect caused by the contractor's negligence. Now the
contractor may be liable on his contract to the city for his
negligence, but he is not liable to the traveler in an action on
the case for damages. The reason sometimes given to sustain
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such a conclusion is that otherwise there would be no end to
suits. But a better ground is that there is no causal connection between the traveler's hurt and the contractor's negligence. The traveler reposed no confidence in the contractor,
nor did the contractor accept any confidence from the traveler.
The traveler, no doubt, reposed confidence in the city that it
would have its bridges and highways in good order; but between the contractor and the traveler intervened the city, an
independent, responsible agent, breaking the causal connection."
In Sec. 438, the same learned author refers to the case of
a contract with the Postmaster-General to furnish certain road-worthy carriages; and after the delivery of the carriages the
plaintiff is injured in using one of them, by reason of the
carriage having been defectively built. "No doubt," says
Mr. Wharton, " had the carriage been built for the plaintiff, he
could have recovered from the contractor. But there is no
confidence exchanged between him and the contractor; and
between thcm, breaking the causal connection is the postmaster-general, acting independently, forming a distinct legal
centre of responsibilities and duties." this rule is distinctly
recognized in Witerbottom v. Jl. ighzt, 10 M. & W. 115.
There, one Atkinson, contracted with the Postmaster-General
to provide a mail-coach to carry the mail-bags over a certain
route. The driver was injured while in this service from a
hidden defect in the coach. In a suit by him- against Atkinson, it was held that he could not recover, ALDERSON, J., saying: " The contract in this case was made with the PostmasterGeneral; and the case is just the same as if he had come to
the defendant and ordered a carriage, and had handed at once
over to Atkinson. The only safe rule is to confine the right
to recover to those who enter into the contract; if we go one
step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go
fifty."
Francisv. Cockrel, L. R. 5 Q. B. 501; Heaven v. Pender,
II Q. B. 503; Collis v. Selden, L. R. 3 C. P. 495, and other English cases, recognize the doctrine that in such instances there
is no duty owing from the contractor to the public. As was
said by MARTIN, B., in Francis v. Cockrel, snpi-a: " The law
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of England looks at proximate liabilities as far as possible,
and endeavors to confine liabilities to the persons immediately
concerned." In Losee v. Clute, 51 N. Y. 494, it was held that
the manufacturerand vendor of a steam boiler is only liable to
the purchaser for defective materials, or for any want of care
and skill in its construction; and if after delivery to and acceptance by the purchaser, and while in use by him, an explosion occurs in consequence of such defective construction, to
the injury of a third person, the latter has no cause of action
because of such injury against the manufacturer.
We do not find that any of the cases cited on behalf of the
plaintiff conflict with the above views. In Godley v. Hagerty,
20 Pa., 387, the builder was the owner, .and he was properly
held responsible for an inherent weakness in the building, by
which an accident occurred. In Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa.,
III,the warehouse was erected under the personal superintendence of the owner, and having leased. it to the government, he was held liable to a person whose goods were
destroyed by the fall of the building in consequence of its
insufficiency for the purpose for which it was erected and
leased. In Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y., 397, the Court
held a dealer in drugs and medicines, who carelessly labels a
deadly poison as a harmless medicine and sends it so labeled
into market, to be liable to all persons who, without fault on
their parts, are injured by using it. We think this case was
correctly decided, but it has no application. The druggist
owed a duty to every person to whom he sold a deadly
poison, to have it properly labeled to avoid accidents. Just
here the analogy between this case and the one in hand ceases.
The defendant owed no duty to the public, as before stated;
his duty was to his employer.
We need not pursue the subject further. 'We regard the
weight of authority as with the views above indicated. Moreover, they are sustained by the better reason. The consequences of holding the opposite doctrine would be far reaching. If the contractor who erects a house, who builds a
bridge or performs any other work; a manufacturer who constructs a boiler, piece of machinery, or a steamship, owes a
duty to the whole world, that his work or his machine or his
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steamship shall contain no hidden defect, it is difficult to
measure the extent of his responsibility, and no prudent man
would engage in such occupations upon such conditions. It
is safer and wiser to confine such liabilities to the parties
immediately concerned. We are of opinion that the defendant's first point should have been affirmed. So, also, his
second point, which asked for a binding instruction in his
favor.
This disposes of the case, and we should stop here were
it not that we do not wish any conclusions to be deduced from
our silence in regard to the portions of the charge referred to
in the fourth and fifth assignments. In these portions of the
charge the learned Judge used very strong expressions in
regard to the alleged departure of the contractor from his
plans and specifications. When the Court characterizes such
departure as " gross and almost criminal negligence," and
" glaringly and knowingly done," "for which he could have
no excuse, except the desire to increase his profits," the defendant has not much chance with the jury. Such intense
expressions are ill-suited to ajudicial charge, and may seriously
interfere with a calm and impartial consideration of the facts by
the jury. More than this, it was assuming the province of the
jury, for the facts are for them. Were there nothing else in
the case, we would reverse upon these assignments alone.
We prefer, however, to place our decision upon a ground
which controls the case.
(Judgment reversed).
"Where a contract creates a duty,
the neglect to perform that duty, as
well as the negligent performance of it,
is a ground of action for tort. Hence
it is at the election of the party injured
to sue either on the contract or on the
tort." Wharton on A' gligence, Sec.
435, Addison on Torts, 913; Boorman
v. Brown, 31 Q. B., 526, I Cl. & F.
I; Ives v. Carter, 24 Conn., 392;
Butts v. Collinrs, 13 Wend. 154; Newmatt v. Fowder, 37 N. J. L. 89.
But it is a rule well established that
"where a tort arises out of a contract,

only a party to the contract can sue."
Tollit v. Sherstone, 5 M. & W. 283.
One who is not a party to a contract,
but who sustains an injury as the result of negligence in the performance
of any duty imposed by the contract,
can not recover from the party who is
guilty of negligence, unless the latter
owes a duty to the plaintiff independent
of such a contract.
As the law on subject is so well
settled, this note must necessarily be
confined to an examination of the cases,
to show under what circumstances it
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has held that there is a duty aside from
a contract, and where it has been held
there is a breach of contract only.
The leading caseon this subject is
Interbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W.
IO9, (1842), cited in the principal case.
In the declaration the plaintiff averred,
"whilst the said several contracts were
in force, having notice thereof, and
trusting and confiding in the contract
between the defendant and the Postmaster-General, and believing that the
said coach was in a fit, safe, secure and
proper state and condition for the
purposes aforesaid, and not knowing,
and not having any means of knowing
to the contrary thereof, hired himself
as mail-coach-man to drive and take
the conduct of said mail-coach, which
but for said contract he would not have
done." And further averred that by
reason of a latent defect of one of the
mail-coaches furnished by said defendant under said contract, it broke down
and he sustained injury. Upon demurrer the Court of Exchequer entered
judgment for defendant upon the
grounds already stated.
In Biakenore v. The Bristol &"
Exeter Ry. Co., 8 E. & B. 1035, (1858),
the defendants furnished, gratuitously,
a crane for the use of consignees of
goods, for the purpose of unloading.
By reason of defects in its construction,
the crane broke and Blakemore, a
volunteer assisting the servants of a
consignee, was injured. The Court of
Queen's Bench held that plaintiff could
not recover. COLERIDGE, J.,in delivering the opinion of the Cou, t, said: "A
breach of duty is alleged in not providing a safe crane; and that duty
under the circumstances, could only
arise from the contract in law between
the borrowei and the lender; and to that
contract James Blakemore was no wise
privy."
idland Ry. Co,, 19 C.
In Alton v.
B. N. S. 213, (z865), a master brought

suit against the railway company to recover for loss of service of his servant,
resulting from a personal injury sustained by the latter, through the negligence of the carrier. The contract by
which the defendants agreed to carry
the servant, was made with the latter,
and not with the master.
The Court held that the duty of the
defendant to safely carry the servant
was not independent of the contract,
but arose out of it, and that none but
one of the stipulating parties could sue
for a breach of a duty arising out of the
contract, and therefore the plaintiff
could not recover.
The rule is well recognized in this
country.
In Savings Bank v. Ward, too U.
S. 195, (1879), Ward, an attorney-atlaw, who had been employed and paid
solely by one Chapman to examine and
report the title of the latter to a certain
lot of ground, gave a certificate over
his signature, stating that - the title of
Chapman to the lot is good and the
property unincumbered." The Savings
Bank, wiith whom Ward had no contract or communication, relied upon
this certificate as true and loaned
money to Chapman, accep'ing as security therefor, a deed of trust of said lot.
It appeared that Chapman had, previous to the time when certificate was
given, sold the lot by a duly recorded
conveyance and which Ward, by exercising a reasonable degree of diligence,
could have discovered. The Supreme
Court held that there being no privity
of contract between the Savingi Bank
and Ward, the former could not recover
for any loss sustained by reason of the
certificate. See also .Kahl v. Love, 37
N. J. L. 5, (874); Safe Co. v. Ward,
4 6N. J. L. i9, (1884); Mayor v. CunI,
2 Comstock 165, (1849); Houseman v. B. & L. Association, 81 Penn.
257 (1876); PassengerR. Co. v. Stutler,
54 Pa. 375, (1867); Jecker v. Murry,
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49 MAich. 517, (1831) ; the recent case
of Roddy v. 01o. Pac.R. R. Co., 140 lo.
234 (1891).
Two reasons have been assigned for
the rule.
In Winterbottom v. Wright, supra,
ALDERSON, B., says:

"1If we were to

hold that the plaintiff could sue in such
a case, there is no point at which such
actions would stop. The only safe rule
is to confine the right to recover to those
who enter into the contract; if we go
one step beyond that, there is no reason
why we should not go fifty."
In Safe Co. v. Ward, supra, DEPUE,
J., says, in delivering the opinion of the
Court: "The reason on which this doctrine rests is obvious. The object of the
parties in inserting in their contract
specific undertakings with respect to the
work to be done, is to create obligations
and duties inter sese. The engagements
and undertakings must necessarily be
subject to modifications waived by the
contracting parties. If third persons can
acquire a right in the contract in the
nature of a duty to have it performed as
contracted for, the parties will be deprived of the control over their own
contract, the employer will have taken
from him the power to direct how the
work shall be done, and the employ6
may find himself under responsibilities
to third parties which do not exist between him and his employer."
Notwithstanding this general rule is
so well settled, there are a number of
cases which appear to be exceptions to
it. Strictly speaking, however, these
cases are not exceptions to the rule
itself, but are instances of a duty being
imposed upon one, not by a contract,
but independent of a contract. As stated
by Mr. Horace Smith, in his treatise on
the Law of -Negligence,page 7, (2ded.):
" The true question always is, has the
defendant committed a breach of duty,
apart from contract? If he has only committed a breach of contract he is liable

only to those with whom he has contracted; but if he has committed a
breach of duty he is not protected by
setting up a contract in respect of the
same matter with another person."
In Heaven v. Pender,L. R. Ii, Q. B.
D. 503 (1883), BRETT, M. R., lays
down the following rule to ascertain
when a duty is owing by one person to
another:
' Whenever one person is by
circumstances placed in such a position
with regard to another, that every one of
ordinary sense who did think would at
at once recognize that, if he did not use
ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances,
he would cause danger of injury to the
persons and property of the others, a
duty arises to use ordinary care and
skill to avoid such danger."
In that case the defendant, a dock
owner, supplied and put up staging outside a ship in his dock under contract
with the ship owner. The plaintiff was
a workman in the employ of a ship
painter who had contracted with the
ship owner to paint the outside of the
ship, and in order to do the painting the
painter went on and used the staging,
when one of the ropes by which it was
hung, being unfit for use when supplied
by the defendant, broke, and by reason
thereof the plaintiff fell into the dock
and was injured. In the Court of Appeal, it was held, reversing the Queen's
Bench Division, that the plaintiff could
recover.
The value of this case as an authority
upon this point is questionable, as the
Court, consisting of BRETT, M. R.,
CoTToN and BoWEN, L. J. J.,were
divided upon the ground of reversal.
BRErr, M. R., was of the opinion that
the defendant must have known, if he
had considered the matter at all, that
the staging would not be used by the
ship owner, and it would be used by
such a person as the plaintiff, a working
ship painter, and that, following the

NOTE TO CURTIN V. SOMERSET.

rule already stated, the defendant owed
a duty to the plaintiff to exercise ordinary care.
COTTON and BOWEN, L. J. J., were
of the opinion that-the plaintiff was en.
entitled to judgment upon the ground
that the plaintiff was upon staging engaged in business in which the dock
owner was interested, and he must be
considered as invited by the dock
owner to use the dock and all appliances provided by the dock owner as
incidents to the use of the dock. In
addition, they stated that they were unwilling to concur with the Master of
Rolls in laying down the broader principle.
In Cotis v. Se/don, L. R. 3 C. P.,
495 (1868,) declaration stated that
the defendants wrongfully, carelessly,
negligently and improperly hung a
chandelier in a public house, knowing
that the plaintiff and others were likely
to be in said public house and near and
under the chandelier, and that the
carefully and
chandelier, unless
properly hung, was likely to fall upon
and injure the plaintiff and others, and
without giving any notice or warning to
the plaintiff of the dangerous way in
which the chandelier was hung, so as
to enable him to protect himself; and
that by means of the premises, and of
the carelessness, negligence, wrongful
and improper conduct of the defendant
in that behalf, the chandelier fell upon
the plaintiff whilst he was lawfully in
the public house and unconscious of
the danger, and greatly hurt him, etc.
To this declaration a demurrer was filed
on the ground that the declaration did
not disclose any duty from the defendant to the plaintiff, for the breach
of which the action would lie.
Judgment was entered for defendant
upon the demurrer, as the declaration
disclosed no duty owing by the defendant to the plaintiff.

In Farrant v. Burzes, II C. B. N. S.,
553 (i862,) the defendant being desirous of sending a carboy of nitric acid
to Croydon, his foreman gave it to one
R., the servant of a railway carrier,
who (as the railway company would
only carry articles of that dangerous
character on one day in each week)
handed it to a servant of a Croydon
carrier, without communicating to him
(and their being nothing in its appearance to indicate) its dangerous nature.
Whilst carrying this carboy to his
coach it burst, and the contents flowed
over the plaintiff, severely injuring him.
The Court held the plaintiff liable, on
the ground that it was the duty of the
defendant, who knew the danger, to
take care that the dangerous character
of the article should be made known to
all persons who were to be concerned
in the carriage of it.
Brassv. Maitland, 6 El. & B., 470.
In Georgev Skivington, L. R. 5 Ex.
1 (1869,) declaration by Joseph George
and Emma, his wife, that the defendant, in the course of his business, professed to sell a chemical compound
made of ingredients known only to him,
and by him represented to be fit to be
used for a hair wash, without injury to
the person using it, and to have been
carefully compounded by him; that the
plaintiff, Joseph George, thereupon
bought of the defendant a bottle of the
hair wash to be used by the plaintiff,
Emma George, as the defendant then
knew, and on the terms that it could be
safely so used and had been carefully
compounded, and alleging as a breach
that the defendant had so negligently
and unskillfully conducted himself in
preparing and selling the hair wash,
that by reason thereof, it was unfit to be
used for washing the hair, whereby the
plaintiff, Emma George, who used it for
that purpose, was injured. On demurrer
it was held that the declaration disclosed
a good cause of action.

NOTE TO CURTIN V. SOMESET.
CLEASBY, B., said: "No person can

sue on a contract but the person with
whom the contract is made; and this
undoubted proposition was attempted to
be taken advantage of in Langridgev.
Levy, 4 M. &W. 3372"
"The answer was that admitting the
proposition to be true, still the vendor
who has been guilty of fraud or deceit
is liable to whomsoever has been injured by that fraud, although not one of
the parties to the original contract, provided at least that his use of the article
was contemplated by the vendor. It
was therefore held in that case that the
boy who ued the defective gun, and
for whose use the defendant knew it
was intended, had a good cause of action. Substitute the word" negligence"
for "fraud" and the analogy between
Langridge v. Levy and this case is
complete."
Losee v. Cite, 51 N. Y.
494 (1873)In Cougfhtry vs. Woolen Co., 56 N. Y.
124, (1874,) a firm contracted with the
defendant to put a cornice on its
mill, scaffolding required for that purpose to be erected by the firm free
of cost to them. Plaintift's intestate,
a workman in the employ of the
contractors, while engaged in the work,
was killed by the fall of the scaffold created by the defendant, for
that work. The plaintiff was nonsuited upon the ground that the defendant owed no duty to the deceased in
respect to the construction of the scaffold, that the only duty resting upon the
defendant in respect to the scaffold arose
out of its contract with the contractors,
and that it was therefore liable to them
only for injury arising from negligence in
its construction: Upon appeal thisjudgment was reversed, the Court of Appeals
holding that the scaffold being erected
upon its own premises for the express
purpose of accommudating the workmen, a duty was imposed upon it towards
them to u~e proper diligence in con-

structing and manufacturing the structure.
A familiar case of a duty independent
of a contract and the consequent right
of a third party to sue, is that of a physician and patient.
If A employs a physician to attend B,
and the latter is injured by reason of
unskillful treatment by the physician,
B may recover damages for the injury.
The duty in such cases arises not from
the contract of employment, but from
the undertaking to treat the patient.
Peptpin dnd Wife vs. Sheppard, aI
Price, 400, (1822.) In that case RICHARDS, C. B., says: "From the necessity
of the thing, the only person who can
properly sustain an action for damages
for an injury done to the person of the
patient is the patient himself, for damages could not be given on that account
to any other person, although the surgeon
may have been retained and employed
by him to undertake the cure. The
party employing the surgeon has nothing to do with the action."
Gladwellvs. Steggal, 5 Bing., N. C.,
292.
From the peculiar circumstances of
the undertaking in that case, the only
right of action is in the servant, and no
action will lie by the master himself,
who makes the contract, for loss of service of his servant, resulting from unskillful treatment by the physician.
Everardvs. Hopkins,2 Bulst, 332.
Another illustration of the independent duty is that where the act of negligence is imminently dangerous to the
lives of others. In such case the
wrongdoer is responsible to the person
injured, whether there be a contract
between them or not.
The leading case of this class is Thomas
6- TWIfe v. Winchester, 2 Selden, 397
(1852). The defendant, engaged in
putting up vegetable extracts, put up
and sold to one Aspinwall, a druggist
engaged in business in New York City,
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a jar of "extract of belladonna"
wbich was imi roperly labeled as "extract of dandelion." Aspinwall relying
upon the label sold this belladona to a
druggist of Cazenovia as extract of
dandelion. The latter sold a portion
of the same to Winchester, which was
administered to the wife of the latter,
by which she was greatly injured.
The Court held that the defendant
was liable. In the o[.inion of the
Court delivered by RUGGLES, C. J.,
much stress is laid upon the fact that
it is a criminal act to falsely label
poisonous medicines. He said, "In
respect to the wrongful and criminal
character of the negligence complained
of, this case differs widely from those
put by the defendant's counsel.
No suchimminent danger existed in
those cases. In the present case the
sale of the poisonous article was made
to a dealer in the drug and not to a
consumer. The injury, therefore, was
not likely to fall on him, or on his
vendee, who was also a dealer, but
much more likely to be visited on a
remote purchaser, as actually happened. The defendant's negligence
put a human life in imminent danger.
Can it be said that there was no duty
on the part of the defendant, to avoid
the creating of that danger by the
exercise of greater caution ? Or that
the exercise of that caution was a duty
only to his immediate vendor whose
life was not endangered? The defendant's duty arose out of the nature of
his business and the damage to others
incident to its mismanagement. Nothing but mischief like that which actually
happened could have been expected
from sending the poison falsely labeled
into the market, and the defendant
is justly responsible for the probable
consequences of the act.
The duty of exercising caution in
this respect did not arise out of the
defendant's contract of sale to Aspin-

wall.
The wreng wiue by the defendant was in putting the l'oison ntislabeled into the hands of Aspinwall as
an article of merchandise to be sold
and afterwards used as an extract of
dandelion by some person then unknown."
In Loop v. Litclfeld, 42 N. Y., 351
(1870,) the defendants sold to one
Collister a balance wheel, manufactured by them, which contained a visible
defect, and which was called to the
attention of the purchaser. This defect was a hole in the wheel, caused
by the shrinkage in the casting, and by
which the wheel was materially weakened.
The defendants filled this
cavity with lead, to secure which a bolt
was inserted, which further weakened
the wheel. It was then adjusted by
defendants to certain machinery of
Collister's, who used it for a period of
about four years. At the end of that
time it burst and a fragment struck and
killed the plaintiff's intestate, who was
using the machinery with the consent
of the owner.
The Court held that the wheel was
not a dangerous instrument and therefore the defendant was not liable. In
delivering the opinion of the Court,
HUNT, J., said : "The appellants recognize the principle of this decision
(Thomas v. Winchester) and seek to
bring their case within it, by asserting
that the fly-wheel in question was a
dangerous instrument. Poison is a
dangerous subject. Gunpowder is the
same. A torpedo is a dangerous instrument, as is a spring-gun, a loaded
rifle or the like. They are instruments
and articles in their nature calculated to
do an injury to mankind, and generally
intended to accomplish that purpose.
They are essentially and in their elements instruments of danger. Not so,
however, is an iron wheel, a few feet in
diameter and a few inches in thickness,
although one part may be weaker than
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another. If the article is abused by too
long use, or by applying too much weight
or speed, an injury may occur as it may
from an ordinary carriage wheel, a
wagon axle, or the common chair in
which we sit. There is scarcely an
object in art or nature, from which an
injury may not occur under such circumstances. Yet they are not in their
nature sources of danger, nor can they
with any regard to the accurate use of
language, be called dangerous instruments. That an injury actually occurred
by the breaking of a carriage axle, the
failure of the carriage body, the falling
to pieces of the chair or sofa, or the
bursting of a fly-wheel, does not in the
least alter its character.
" It is suggested that it is no more
dangerous or illegal to label deadly
poison as a harmless medicine than to
conceal a defect in a machine and paint
it over so that it will appear sound.
Waiving the point that there was no
concealment, but that the defect was
fully explained to the purchaser, I answer that the decision in Thomas v.
Winchester was based upon the idea
that the negligent sale of poisons is both
at common law and by statute an indictable offence. If the act in that case
had been done by the defendant instead
of his agent, and the death of Mrs.
Thomas had ensued, the defendant
would have been guilty of manslaughter
as held by the Court. The injury in
that case was a natural result of the act.
It was just what was to be expected
from putting falsely labeled poisons in
the market, to be used by whosoever
should need the true articles. It was
in its nature an act imminently dangerous to the lives of others. Not so here.
The bursting of the wheel and the injury to human life was not the result or
expected consequence of the manufacture and sale of the wheel. Every use
of the counterfeit medicine would be
necessarily injurious, while the wheel

was, in fact, used with safety for five
years."
In Davidson v. Nichols, rI Allen 514
(1866,) the defendant, who was a chemist sold to one Geyer, an apothecary,
sulphide of antimony in mistake for
black oxide of manganese.
Geyer
without opening the package sold this
sulphide of antimony to the plaintiff as
black oxide of manganese. The plaintiff believing this substance to be black
oxide of manganese, proceeded to use it
in combination with chlorate of potassia,
with which it might safely be used, but
from the combination of which with
sulphide of antimony a dangerous explosion followed, by which the plaintiff
was injured.
It was held that the plaintiff could
not recover as the substance itself was
not dangerous and become so only when
used in a manner of which the defendants had no notice.
In Roddy v. Ao. Pac.R. Co., i4o Mo.
234 (189t,) it was held that the a railway car with a defective brake was not
imminently dangerous.
The principle enunciated in Winchester vs. Thomas, that when the act
of negligence is imminently dangerous
to the lives of others, any one who
suffers from such negligence, no matter
how remote, may recover, has been
cited with approval by many writers,
and in numerous cases, but it is believed
that the principle has never been followed in any decided case, and it may
be questioned whether, as suggested by
Brett. M. R. in Heaven vs. Pender,the
decision did no go too far.
Another ground upon which a few
cases have decided is that of fraud.
In Langridge vs. Levy, 2 M. & W.,
519, the declaration states that the
father of the plaintiff, bargained with
the defendant to buy of him a gun, to
wit, for the use of himself and his sons,
and the defendant then by falsely and
fraudulently warranting the gun to have
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been made by Nock, and to be a good,
safe and secure gun, then sold the same
to the plaintiff's father for the use of
himself and his sons, whereas in truth
and in fact the defendant was guilty of
great breach of duty, and of wilful
deceit, negligence and improper conduct, in this, that the gun was not made
by Nock, nor was a good, safe or secure
gun, but, on the contrary thereof, was
made by a very inferior maker to Nock,
and was a bad, unsafe, ill-manufactured
and inferior gun, and of wholly unsound and very inferior materials; all
of which the defendant, at the time,
and warranty of such sale, had notice:
and that the plaintiffknowing and confiding in the said warranty, used the gun,
which but for the warranty he would
not have done; and that the gun being
in the hands of the plaintiff, by reason
and wholly in consequence of its weak,
dangerous, and insufficient construction
and materials, burst and exploded;
whereby the plaintiff was greatly injured, etc. Upon motion in arrest of
judgment the action was maintained.
Baron Parke, said: "If the instrument
in question, which is not of itself dangerous, but which requires an act to be
done, that is, to be loaded, in order to
make it so, had been simtly delivered by
the defendant without any contract or
representation upon his part, to the
plaintiff, an action would have been
maintainable for any subsequent damage
which the plaintiff might have sustained
by the use of it But if it had been
delivered by the defendant to the
plaintiff, for the purpose of being so
used by him, with an accompanying representation to him that he might safely
so ase it, and that representation had
beenfalse to the defendant's knowledge,
and the plaintiff had acted upon the
faith of its being true, and had received
damage thereby, then there is no question but that an action would have lain
upon the principle of a numerous class

of cases, of which the leading one is
that of Paisley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51
which principle is, that a mere naked
falsehood is not enough to give a right
of action; but if it be a falsehood told
with an intention that it should be acted
upon by the party injured, and that
must produce damage to him; if, instead
of its being delivered to the plaintiff
immediately, the instrument had b.en
placed in the hands of a third person,
for the purpose of being delivered to
and then used by the plaintf, the like
false representation being knowingly
made to the intermediate party to be
communicated to the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff had acted upon it, there can be
no doubt but that the principle would
equally apply, and the plaintiff would
have had his remedy for the deceit;
nor could it make any difference also
that the third person also was intended
by the defendant to be deceived; nor
does there seem to be any substantial
distinction of the instrument to be delivered, in order to be so used by the
plaintiff, although it does not appear
that the defendant intended the false
representation itself to be communicated
to him. There is false representation
made by the defendant, with a view
that the plaint&' should use the instrzment in a dangerous way, and, unless
the representation had been made, the
dangerous act would never have been
made. Upon appeal this judgment was
affirmed. 4 M. & W., 337In Longmead and 9Iye v. Holliday,
2o L. 3. Ex. 430; 6 Eng. L. & Eq., 562,
(185i) the declaration in case by Longmead and his wife stated that the defendant, who was the maker and seller
of certain lamps called "Holliday's
lamps," sold to the husband one of
these lamps, to be used by his wife and
himself in his shop, and fraudulently
warranted that it was reasonably fit for
that purpose ; that the wife, confiding
in that warrantry, attempted to use it,
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but that in consequence of the insufficient materials with which it was constructed, it exploded and burnt her. At
the trial the jury found that the accident,
had been caused by the defective nature
of the lamp; but that the defendant
wis ignorant of this unsoundess, and
had *old the lamp in good faith. This
finding of the jury negativing any fraud
on the part of the defendant, the Court.
of Exchequer held that the action
could not be maintained by the wife,
who was not a party to the contract.
Taking all these cases into consideration, it is evident that in many instances it is very difficult to determine
whether the negligence complained of
is a mere breach of. contract, 4nd for
which only a party to the contract can
sue, or whether it is a breach of contract which also constitutes a breach of
duty owing to some third person, aside
from such contract, and for which
breach such third person may bring suit.
To ascertain when such independent
duty exists it is evident that the contract itself must be excluded from consideration, and recourse must be had to
the relations between the parties.
The rule enunciated by the Master of
the Rolls in Heaven v. Fender,appears
to be the true one to apply to determine whether such relations create any
duty,
His remarks upon the application of
this rule to the various cases, while but
a dictum, is so instructive as to be
worthy of quotation :
"Let us apply this proposition to the
case of one person supplying goods or
machinery, or instruments, or utensils,
or the. like, for the purpose of their
being used by another person, but with
whom there is no contract as to the
supply. The proposition will stand
thus: Whenever one person supplies
goods, or machinery, or the like, for
the purpose of their being used by
another person, under such circum-

stances that every one of an ordinary
sense would if he thought, recognize at
once that, unless he used ordinary care
and skill, with regard to the condition
of the things supplied or the modes of
supplying it, there will be danger of
*injury to the persons or property of him
for whose use the thing is supplied,
and who is to use it, a duty arises to
use ordinary care and skill as to the
condition and manner of supplying
such thing. And for a neglect of such.
ordinary care or skill as the consideration or manner of supplying such
thing. And for neglect of such ordinary care or skill whereby injury hap.
pened, a legal liability arises, to be
enforced by an action for negligence.
This includes the care of goods, etc.,
supplied to be used immediately by a
particular person or persons, or one of
a class of persons, where it would be
obvious to the person supplying it, if he
thought that the goods would in all
probability be used at once by such
persons before a reasonable opportunity
for discovering a defect which might
exist, and where the things supplied
would be of such a nature that a neglect of ordinary care or skill as to its
condition or the manner of supplying it
-would probably cause danger to the
person or property of the person for
whose use it was supplied and who
was about to use it. It would exclude
a case in which the goods are supplied
under circumstances in which it would
be a chance by whom they would be
used or whether they would be used or
not, or whether they would be used
before there would be probably be
means of observing any defects, or
where the goods would be of such a
nature that a want of care or skill as to
their condition or the manner of supplying them would probably not produce
danger or injury to person or property."
HORAcE L. CHEYNEY.
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